Sentinel IA Β· Overview
Stato real-time delle due sentinelle cross-cutting Β· ultime 24h
Decisions 24h
β
β
Allow
β
β
Redact
β
β
HITL
β
β
Block
β
β
Agent gated
β
β
β I 6 Judge di governance
Caricamentoβ¦
Compliance posture
ISO 42001 evidence pack prontoEU AI Act Art. 14
Human oversight β
Stop button attivo Β· HITL gate live
EU AI Act Art. 15
Robustezza β
Quarantena RAG Β· canary attivi
GDPR Art. 22
No solo-auto β
11/11 azioni significative β HITL
NIST AI RMF
MEASURE β
12 categorie Β· baseline 30gg
π Kill switch console
Arresto immediato di tutti gli agent Β· EU AI Act Art. 14 "stop button"
Kill switch GLOBALE
Spegne istantaneamente tutti gli agent operatori su tutti i tenant Β· KV flag sentinel:kill:global
ATTIVO
Kill switch per tenant
GranularitΓ Β· KVsentinel:kill:<tenant>
Attiva un kill per-tenant:
| Tenant | Attivato da | Motivo | Da | Azione |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| ||||
Storico attivazioni kill switch (90gg)
| Data/ora | Scope/Tenant | Azione | Attivato da | Motivo |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| ||||
π Privacy Sentinel
Detection PII Β· cross-tenant Β· secret Β· canary Β· GDPR Art. 22/25
ModalitΓ : SHADOW
Policy & patterns
Decisions (24h)
Calibration
Constitution v3.1
Pattern PII (hard rail)
Codice fiscale IT
^[A-Z]{6}[0-9]{2}[A-Z][0-9]{2}[A-Z][0-9]{3}[A-Z]$
BLOCK
IBAN
^[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{20,30}$
BLOCK
Email indirizzo
[\w.+-]+@[\w-]+\.[\w.-]+
REDACT
JWT token
eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}
BLOCK
API key generic
(sk|pk|ghp|xoxb)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}
BLOCK
Carta di credito
\b(?:\d[ -]*?){13,16}\b
BLOCK
Egress allow-list (URL outbound)
Block automatico:
file:// Β· RFC1918 Β· 169.254.169.254 Β· metadata endpointsCanary tokens (per tenant)
| Tenant | Canary token | Trip count | Ultimo trip |
|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| |||
| Timestamp | Agent | Tenant | Tool | Categoria | Verdetto | Confidence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| |||||||
Decisions revisionate
187
True positive
171
False positive
16
FP rate corrente
8.5%
target < 5%
Decisions in attesa di review
| Decision | Pattern matched | Output preview | Tuo verdetto |
|---|---|---|---|
| d_8f4a2c | Email pattern | support@nh-itsm.cloud | |
| d_3b91e7 | JWT pattern | eyJhbGci...zNiJ9 | |
| d_d52f8a | Codice fiscale | RSSMRA80A... |
# Privacy Constitution v3.1
# Source: ISO 42001 + GDPR Art. 25 + EU AI Act Art. 15
# Locked Β· modify via PR + sadmin approval
## Principle 1 β Tenant isolation
Every piece of data carries a tenant_id. The agent MUST refuse
to surface, combine, or summarize data whose tenant_id differs
from the requesting context tenant.
## Principle 2 β Data minimization (GDPR Art. 25)
Output the minimum information necessary to fulfill the request.
Do not enrich responses with auxiliary PII unless explicitly required.
## Principle 3 β Secret confinement
Credentials (API keys, JWT, passwords, tokens, private keys)
NEVER leave the agent boundary. If detected in output β BLOCK.
## Principle 4 β Canary integrity
System prompts contain per-tenant canaries. Their appearance in
any output, log, or downstream message is treated as exfiltration.
## Principle 5 β Right to be forgotten (GDPR Art. 17)
Subjects in the deletion-log MUST NOT be retrievable via RAG,
vector search, or memory recall. Refuse and audit.
## Principle 6 β Automated decision guard (GDPR Art. 22)
Decisions with legal or significant effect on a person (employment,
access, contract termination, payment denial) require HITL.
## Principle 7 β Egress confinement
Outbound URLs must be in the tenant egress allow-list.
RFC1918, metadata endpoints, file://, localhost are forbidden.
β οΈ Safety Sentinel
Destructive intercept Β· blast radius Β· RBAC escalation Β· runaway Β· EU AI Act Art. 14
ModalitΓ : SHADOW
Rules & thresholds
Decisions (24h)
Calibration
Constitution v2.4
Destructive verbs (intercept hard)
SQL DELETE/DROP/TRUNCATE
/^(DELETE|DROP|TRUNCATE)\s/i2-PERSONShell rm/chmod 777
/(rm\s+-rf|chmod\s+777)/BLOCKMass transition CLOSED
tool=ticket.bulk_transition AND target=ClosedDRY-RUNRBAC revoke-all
tool=rbac.revoke AND scope=all2-PERSONPassword reset bulk
tool=user.reset_password AND count>1BLOCKBlast radius Β· soglie
| Tool class | Soglia warning | Soglia HITL | Hard cap |
|---|---|---|---|
| ticket.* (state change) | |||
| user.* (account ops) | |||
| email.send (broadcast) | |||
| cmdb.* (CI delete) |
Runaway / loop guard
HITL forced operations
| Operazione | Approver richiesto | SLA | Stato |
|---|---|---|---|
| RBAC grant / revoke | tenant admin | 4h | attivo |
| Cambio ruolo utente | tenant admin + manager | 8h | attivo |
| MFA bypass | sadmin | 1h | attivo |
| Password reset | tenant admin | 2h | attivo |
| Eliminazione CI (cmdb) | service owner | 24h | attivo |
| Mass email (>200) | tenant admin | 1h | attivo |
| Timestamp | Agent | Tenant | Tool | Rule | Verdetto | Blast | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| |||||||
Reviewed
142
TP
133
FP
9
FP rate
6.3%
target < 3%
# Safety Constitution v2.4
# Source: EU AI Act Art. 14 + NIST AI RMF MEASURE/MANAGE
# Locked Β· modify via PR + sadmin approval
## Principle 1 β Least privilege
An agent's signed capability token bounds what it can invoke.
Out-of-scope tool calls are denied before reaching execution.
## Principle 2 β Reversibility
Every state-changing action MUST log its inverse to the
reversibility ledger. Non-reversible actions trigger HITL.
## Principle 3 β Blast radius proportionality
The number of entities affected by a single action must be
proportional to the agent's tier and the request's explicit scope.
Thresholds are tenant-configurable; defaults follow NH catalog.
## Principle 4 β Two-person integrity
Destructive verbs (DELETE bulk, RBAC revoke-all, MFA bypass,
mass password reset) require two distinct human approvals.
## Principle 5 β Runaway containment
Recursive sub-agent chains, tool-call loops, and budget overruns
trigger automatic pause + reversibility playback.
## Principle 6 β Egress to humans
Outbound communications (email, Slack, Teams) impersonating a
human user must pass the social-engineering classifier and a
tenant-level draft review.
## Principle 7 β Stop button (Art. 14)
A platform admin can halt all agents globally or per-tenant.
This signal is sampled by every tool dispatcher before execution.
π Decisions explorer
Audit trail unificato Privacy + Safety Β· esportabile (ISO 42001 evidence)
| Time | Sentinel | Agent | Tenant | Ticket | Tool | Rule / Pattern | Verdetto | Conf | Lat | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| ||||||||||
π― Calibration center
Review FP/TP delle decisioni Β· target switch SHADOW β ENFORCE quando FP < soglia
Decisioni totali revisionate
329
Privacy FP rate
8.5%
target < 5%
Safety FP rate
6.3%
target < 3%
Switch ENFORCE
11gg
stimati
Queue review (7 in attesa)
prioritΓ : BLOCK > REDACT > HITL > ALLOW campionati| ID | Sentinel | Pattern / rule | Preview | Agent | Confidence | Tuo verdetto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| ||||||
Trend FP rate (30gg)
π Privacy
14% β 8.5% in 30gg Β· trend β
β οΈ Safety
11% β 6.3% in 30gg Β· trend β
β©οΈ Reversibility log
Ogni azione state-changing logga l'azione inversa Β· rollback umano (saga pattern)
| Time | Agent | Tenant | Azione | EntitΓ affette | Inverse action | Scade | Azione |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caricamento⦠| |||||||
π€ Per-agent sentinel toggle
Flag
sentinel.enabled per agent Β· default ON nuovi Β· back-compat per esistentiAgent Β· Tier Β· Domain
Tenant
Privacy
Safety
Stato
Decisions 24h
Caricamentoβ¦
π Constitution registry
Versioni firmate delle costituzioni Β· evidence ISO 42001 + EU AI Act
π Privacy Constitutions
| Versione | Hash | Effective | Firmata da | Stato |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v3.1 | a8f4...c2e1 | 2026-05-22 | nhadmin | attiva |
| v3.0 | 7c91...8b3d | 2026-04-15 | sadmin | retired |
| v2.5 | 3b91...e7d2 | 2026-02-01 | nhadmin | retired |
| v2.4 | d52f...8a0c | 2025-11-12 | goodadmin | retired |
β οΈ Safety Constitutions
| Versione | Hash | Effective | Firmata da | Stato |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2.4 | 7c91...8b3d | 2026-05-22 | nhadmin | attiva |
| v2.3 | 5f33...e0a1 | 2026-03-08 | sadmin | retired |
| v2.2 | 9c4d...11e2 | 2025-12-22 | nhadmin | retired |
Proposta v3.2 (Privacy) in review
PR aperta Β· 2 approver richiestiDiff principale
+ ## Principle 8 β Vendor data residency
+ Outbound calls to AI vendors must respect tenant
+ data-residency configuration. EU tenants β EU regions only.
+ Violations β BLOCK + tenant admin alert.
+ Outbound calls to AI vendors must respect tenant
+ data-residency configuration. EU tenants β EU regions only.
+ Violations β BLOCK + tenant admin alert.
Approvazioni
| sadmin | approved |
| nhadmin | pending |
| goodadmin | not requested |